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Abstract—Along with the proliferation of Artificial Intelligence
(AI) and Internet of Things (IoT) techniques, various kinds of
adversarial attacks are increasingly emerging to fool Deep Neural
Networks (DNNs) used by Industrial IoT (IIoT) applications.
Due to biased training data or vulnerable underlying models,
imperceptible modifications on inputs made by adversarial at-
tacks may result in devastating consequences. Although existing
methods are promising in defending such malicious attacks,
most of them can only deal with limited existing attack types,
which makes the deployment of large-scale IIoT devices a great
challenge. To address this problem, we present an effective
federated defense approach named FDA3 that can aggregate
defense knowledge against adversarial examples from different
sources. Inspired by federated learning, our proposed cloud-
based architecture enables the sharing of defense capabilities
against different attacks among IIoT devices. Comprehensive
experimental results show that the generated DNNs by our
approach can not only resist more malicious attacks than existing
attack-specific adversarial training methods, but also can prevent
IIoT applications from new attacks.
Index Terms—Adversarial attack, federated defense, industrial
IoT, CNN robustness, adversarial training.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Learning (DL) techniques are increasingly deployed
in safety-critical Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and Internet
of Things (IoT) areas such as autonomous driving, commercial
surveillance, and robotics, where the prediction correctness of
inputs is of crucial importance [1]–[4]. However, along with
the prosperity of Industrial IoT (IIoT) applications, they are
inevitably becoming the main targets of malicious adversaries
[5], [6]. No matter the adversarial attacks are intentional or
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unintentional, due to biased training data or overfitting/under-
fitting models, the slightly modified inputs often make vul-
nerable IoT applications demonstrate incorrect or unexpected
behaviors, which may cause disastrous consequences.
Most of existing adversarial attacks focus on generating
IIoT inputs with perturbations, which are named “adversarial
examples” [7] to fool Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). Such
adversarial examples can mislead the classifier models to
predict incorrect outputs, while they are not distinguishable by
human eyes. To resist these attacks, various defense methods
were proposed, e.g., ensemble diversity [8], PuVAE [9], and
adversarial training. However, most of them are not suitable
for IIoT applications. This is mainly because: i) most defense
methods focus on defending one specific type of attacks; and
ii) IIoT applications are usually scattered in different places
in face of various adversarial attacks. In this situation, IIoT
devices with the same type should be equipped with different
DNNs to adapt to different environments. Things become even
worse when various new adversarial attacks are emerging,
since it is hard for IIoT designers to quickly find a new solution
to defend such attacks.
As a distributed machine learning approach, Federated
Learning (FL) [10] enables training of a high-quality central-
ized model over a large quantity of decentralized data residing
on IIoT devices. It has been widely studied to address the
fundamental problems of privacy, ownership, and locality of
data for the cloud-based architecture, where the number of
participating devices is huge but the Internet connection is
slow or unreliable. Based on the federated averaging technique
[11], FL allows the training of a DNN without revealing
the data stored on IIoT devices. The weights of new DNNs
are synthesized using FL in the cloud, constructing a global
model which is then pushed back to different IIoT devices
for inference. However, so far none of existing FL-based
approaches investigated the defense of adversarial attacks for
IIoT applications.
Since cloud-based architectures can extend processing capa-
bilities of IoT devices by offloading their partial computation
tasks to remote cloud servers, the combination of cloud com-
puting and IoT is becoming a popular paradigm that enables
large-scale intelligent IIoT applicationsm, where IIoT devices
are connected with the cloud in a CPS context [12]. However,
no matter whether the role of cloud servers is for training
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2or inference, IIoT devices are required to send original data
to cloud servers, where the network latency and data privacy
issues cannot be neglected. Moreover, if devices of an IIoT
application adopt DNNs with the same type, the robustness
of the application can be easily violated due to the varieties
of adversarial attacks. Therefore, how to generate a robust
DNN for a large quantity of IIoT devices with the same
type while the privacy of these devices can be protected is
becoming a challenge. Inspired by the concept of federated
learning, this paper presents an effective federated defense
framework named FDA3 for large-scale IIoT applications. It
makes following three major contributions:
1) We propose a new loss function for the adversarial
training on IIoT devices, which fully takes the diversities
of adversarial attacks into account.
2) We present an efficient federated adversarial learning
scheme that can derive robust DNNs to resist a wide
spectrum of adversarial attacks.
3) Based on the cloud-based architecture, we introduce a
novel federated defense framework for large-scale IIoT
applications.
Experimental results on two well-known benchmark datasets
show that the DNNs generated by our proposed approach on
IIoT devices can resist more adversarial attacks than state-of-
the-art methods. Moreover, the robustness of the generated
DNNs becomes better when the size of investigated IIoT
applications grows larger.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the related work on defense mechanisms against
adversarial attacks for DNN-based IoT designs. Section III
introduces our federated defense framework FDA3 in detail.
Section IV presents experimental results, showing the effec-
tiveness and scalability of our approach. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
When more and more safety-critical IoT applications adopt
DNNs, the robustness of DNNs is becoming a major concern
in IoT design [4], [13], [14]. The vulnerability of DNNs has
been widely investigated by various malicious adversaries,
who can generate physical adversarial examples to fool DNNs
[15], [16]. Typically, existing attack methods can be classified
into two categories, i.e., white-box attacks which assume that
DNN structures are available, and black-box attacks without
the knowledge of DNN architectures. For example, as a kind
of well-known white-box attack, Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [17] tries to add adversarial perturbations in the
direction of the loss gradients. In [15], Kurakin et al. intro-
duced the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) by applying FGSM
multiple times with small step size. In [18], the Jacobian-
based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) is introduced to identify
features of the input that most significantly impact output
classification. JSMA crafts adversarial examples based on
computing forward derivatives. To minimize the disturbance
while achieving better attack effects, Carlini and Wagner [19]
designed an optimization function-based attack, named CW2.
In [20], DeepFool is proposed that uses iterative linearization
and geometric formulas to generate adversarial examples.
Unlike above attacks, SIMBA [21] is a kind of simple but
effective black-box attack. Instead of investigating gradient
directions as used in FGSM, SIMBA picks random directions
to perturb images.
To address adversarial attacks, various defense mechanisms
have been investigated. Typically, they can be classified into
three categories [9]. The first type (e.g., ensemble diver-
sity [8], Jacobian Regularization [22]) optimizes the gradient
calculation of target classifiers. However, when processing
nature images, the performance of these defense approaches
may degrade. The second type (e.g., PuVAE [9], feature
squeezing [23]) tries to purify the inputs of target classifiers
via extra auto-encoders or filters. Nonetheless, the extra facil-
ities inevitably increase the workload of host IIoT devices.
By modifying training data, the third type can be used to
regularize target classifiers. As an outstanding example of the
third type, adversarial training [17], [24] targets to achieve
robust classifiers based on the training on both adversarial
and nature examples. However, existing adversarial training
methods for specific IIoT devices only focus on a limited
number of adversarial attack types. Therefore, the trained
models using above methods usually cannot be directly used
by devices deployed in new environment.
Aiming at improving the performance of training, federated
learning [10], [25] is becoming widely used in generating
centralized models while ensuring high data privacy for large-
scale distributed applications [11]. Although it has been stud-
ied in IIoT design, it focuses on the data privacy issues [26]
rather than adversarial attacks. To the best of our knowledge,
our work is the first attempt that adopts the concept of
federated learning to construct a defense framework against
various adversarial attacks for large-scale IIoT applications.
III. OUR FEDERATED DEFENSE APPROACH
Due to privacy information leakage, adversaries can obtain
DNN model information from IIoT devices for attack pur-
poses. In our approach, under the help of privacy protection
mechanisms provided by IIoT devices, we assume that the
model cracking time is longer than the model update period.
In this case, adversaries always cannot obtain the latest ver-
sion of models used by IIoT devices. However, adversaries
can use transfer attacks to fool DNN models based on the
privacy information they obtained. This paper focuses on how
to retrain the threaten model, so that it can resist various
types of adversarial examples generated by adversaries. The
following subsections will introduce our cloud-based federated
3defense architecture, loss function for device-level federated
adversarial training, and model update and synchronization
processes in detail.
A. The Architecture of FDA3
Figure 1 details the framework of FDA3 together with its
workflow, which is inspired by the adversarial training and
federated learning methods. The architecture of our approach
consists of two parts, i.e., IIoT devices and their cloud server.
Besides the function of inference, the DNNs resided in IIoT
devices are responsible for the DNN evolution for resisting
adversarial examples. Initially, all the devices share the same
DNN. Since they are deployed in different environments, they
may encounter different input examples and different types of
attacks. Such imbalances make the federated learning a best
solution to aggregate different defense capabilities.
The cloud server consists of two modules, i.e., attack mon-
itor module and federated defense model generation module.
The attack monitor module is used to record the latest attack
information for IIoT devices according to their locations
or types. The module manages a library consisting of all
the reported attack schemes (i.e., source code or executable
programs). Such information can be collected by IIoT device
producers or from third-party institutions. When the attack
monitor module detects some new attack for a device, it
will require the device to download the corresponding attack
scheme for the purpose of adversarial retraining. Similar to
federated learning, the federated defense model generation
module periodically collects device gradient information and
aggregates them to achieve an updated model with better
robustness. Then the module will dispatch the newly formed
model to all the connected IIoT devices for the purpose of
model synchronization.
During the execution of an IIoT device, the device keeps
a buffer to hold a set of nature examples that are collected
randomly when their prediction confidence is high. For a
specific period, all the IIoT devices need to be retrained and
synchronized in a federated learning way. This process consists
of three steps. First, based on the assigned attack schemes
by the cloud server, each device generates corresponding
adversarial examples locally to form a retraining set, whose
elements are pairs of nature examples and corresponding
adversarial examples. In the second step, the local adversar-
ial training process periodically uploads the newly achieved
gradient information from IIoT devices to the cloud server
for the model update and synchronization. Finally, similar
to federated learning, the model generated by our federated
defense approach will be deployed on each connected IIoT
devices. Note that when a new IoT devices joins the IIoT
application, it needs to download the new model from the
server. Due to the diversities of different devices, the new
model is more robust, which can resist more attacks of
different types. Since the interactions between the cloud server
and IIoT devices only involves gradient information, the data
privacy of IIoT devices can be guaranteed.
B. Loss Function Modeling
In machine learning, loss functions are used for classifica-
tion representing the cost paid for inaccurate predictions. In
the context of deep learning, the loss functions can be used in
the training phase to optimize the model prediction accuracy.
When taking adversarial attacks into account, the definitions
of loss functions for adversarial training are different from
traditional ones. Most existing loss functions for adversarial
training consist of two components, i.e., the normal loss
function and the adversarial loss function [17]. They can be
formulated as:
L (x, xˆ,y|θ) = (1−α)Lnormal (x,y | θ)+αLadv (xˆ,y | θ) . (1)
The notation Lnormal (x,y | θ) denotes the normal loss function,
where x and y represent the nature (normal) example and the
classification label when the model’s parameter is θ. Similar
to the definition of Lnormal (x,y | θ), the notation Ladv (xˆ,y | θ)
is used to denote the adversarial loss function, where xˆ
denote the adversarial example generated from x. The notation
L (x, xˆ,y | θ) represents the overall loss function of adversarial
training. The hyperparameter α (α ∈ [0,1]) in Equation (1) is
used to set the proportion of the adversarial loss function in
the overall loss function. The higher value of α indicates the
higher weight of the adversarial loss function contributing to
the overall loss function.
For different adversarial attacks, there exist different ways
to achieve an optimal θ that can minimize L (x, xˆ,y | θ). As an
example of FGSM attacks which are of L∞ norm, the optimal
θ can be calculated using:
θ∗ = argmin
θ
E
x⊆D
ï
max
‖xˆ−x‖∞≤ε
L (x, xˆ,y | θ)
ò
, (2)
where D denotes the training set and the L∞ norm ‖xˆ−x‖∞≤ ε
specifies the allowable difference between nature and adver-
sarial examples. Note that Equation (2) focuses on adversarial
attacks of L∞ norm (e.g., FGSM, BIM). It cannot deal with
adversarial attacks of L0 norm (e.g., JSMA) and L2 norm (e.g.,
CW2, DeepFool, SIMBA). To cover all possible attacks for an
IIoT application with N devices, we extend L (x, xˆ,y|θ) defined
in Equation (1) as follows:
L f ed (x, xˆ,y | θ) = 1N Σ
N
k=1L
Ä
xk, xˆk,yk | θ
ä
. (3)
The notation L f ed (x, xˆ,y | θ) denotes the loss function of our
federated defense approach, which equals to the arithmetic
average of all the loss functions of N devices participating
in adversarial training. Here, xˆ denotes the set of all the
adversarial examples generated by the N devices, and x and
y denote the nature examples and their corresponding labels,
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Fig. 1: The framework and workflow of FDA3
respectively. The symbols xk, xˆk, yk denote the nature exam-
ples, adversarial examples and corresponding labels of the kth
device. The optimization target of our federated adversarial
training is to figure out an optimal θ which can be formulated
as:
θ∗ = argmin
θ
{
E
x⊆D,xˆ⊆DL∞
î
max
||xˆ−x||∞≤ε
L f ed (x, xˆ,y|θ)
ó
+
E
x⊆D,xˆ⊆DL0
î
max
||xˆ−x||0≤σ
L f ed (x, xˆ,y|θ)
ó
+
E
x⊆D,xˆ⊆DL2
î
max
||xˆ−x||2≤δ
L f ed (x, xˆ,y|θ)
ó} (4)
In Equation (4) we use DL0 , DL2 and DL∞ to indicate
generated adversarial examples of norm L0, norm L2 and L∞
from D, respectively. We can find that Equation (4) tries to
figure out one comprehensive defense model that can resist a
wide range of known attacks with higher accuracy than locally
retrained models.
C. Federated Defense Model Generation
Our federated defense approach consists of two parts, i.e.,
IIoT devices and corresponding cloud server. During the exe-
cution, IIoT devices randomly collect a set of nature examples
with high confidence on-the-fly and save them in their local
memory. Based on attack schemes assigned by the cloud sever,
IIoT devices generate adversarial examples for their model re-
training. Note that due to the limited resources (e.g., memory
size, computing power) of IIoT devices, usually cloud servers
only assign limited number of attack schemes to IIoT devices.
Similar to federated learning, the adversarial training process
of our federated defense method involves multiple epochs,
where an epoch may involve multiple iterations based on the
user specified batch size. In our approach, we consider each
iteration as a round. Within a round, all the IIoT devices
send gradient information obtained from their locally retrained
models to the cloud server, and then the cloud server aggre-
gates the gradients and synchronizes the updated model with
all the IIoT devices.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Training Procedure for IIoT Devices
Input: i) S, cloud server; ii) att, adversarial attack types;
iii) b, batch size; iv) α, hyperparameter;
v) E, # of epochs; vi) K, device index;
vii) F, device model;
Output:
1: while true do
2: xnat =Collect ()
3: xadv = AdvGen
(
xnat ,att,F,θK
)
. θK , device model
weight
4: ynat = F
(
xnat ,θK
)
5: yadv = F
(
xadv,θK
)
6: xAnat = Augumentation(xnat , |att|)
7: yAnat = Augumentation(ynat , |att|)
8: for e ∈ {1,2, · · · ,E} do
9: for i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,d |xnat |b e} do
10:
Ä
xA,inat ,y
A,i
nat ,yiadv
ä
= partition
(
xAnat ,y
A
nat ,yadv,b, i
)
11: yA,i∗nat = F
Ä
xA,inat ,θK
ä
12: yi∗adv = F
(
xiadv,θ
K)
13: normal loss =CrossEntropy
Ä
yA,inat ,y
A,i∗
nat
ä
14: adv loss =CrossEntropy
Ä
yA,inat ,yi∗adv
ä
15: Loss = α∗normal loss+(1−α)∗adv loss
16: ∇θe,i =AdamOptimizer.compute gradients
(
Loss,θK
)
17: send
(
∇θe,i,K,S
)
. Send gradients to cloud server
18: θK = sync recv(K,S)
19: end for
20: end for
21: end while
Algorithm 1 details the local adversarial training procedure
5for IIoT devices. Note that we assume that the IIoT device
with index K has been connected to the server and its model
is the same as the one of the server initially. In step 2, the
device tries to collect nature examples with high prediction
confidence randomly. Based on the old model (i.e., F and θK)
and the assigned attack schemes att by the cloud server, step
3 generates the adversarial examples for Xnat using transfer
attacks attacks. Note that if the cardinality of att (i.e., |att|) is
larger than one, step 3 will generate |att| adversarial attacks
of different types for each example in Xnat . Since all the
examples in Xnat are collected with high confidence, step 4
tries to figure out the labels for them. Similar to step 4, step 5
obtains the prediction results for all the generated adversarial
examples. Step 6 enlarges both Xnat and Ynat by duplicating
them |att| times for the following loss function calculation
in steps 13-14. Steps 8-20 iteratively interact with the cloud
server, where steps 10-18 form one round for the gradient
aggregation and model update. Step 10 divides the nature and
adversarial examples batch by batch. Steps 11-12 figure out
the prediction labels for nature and adversarial examples in
the same batch, respectively. Steps 13-15 calculate the overall
loss function based on the nature and adversarial examples
in the batch using the equation defined in Equation (1). Step
16 computes the gradient information and step 17 sends it to
the cloud server. Step 18 updates the local model using the
aggregated gradient information sent by the cloud server. Note
that the sync recv is a blocking function waiting for the reply
from the cloud server.
Algorithm 2 Model Generation Procedure for Cloud Server
Input: i) θS, weight of the server model;
ii) b, batch size;
iii) E, # of epochs;
iv) N, # of devices;
v) nat, # of nature examples on one device;
Output:
1: while true do
2: for e ∈ {1,2, · · · ,E} do
3: for i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,d |nat|b e}} do
4: for K ∈ {1,2, · · · ,N} do
5: ∇θe,iK = receive(K) . Receive K
th device’s
gradients
6: end for
7: ∇θe,iS =
1
NΣ
N
K=1∇θ
e,i
K . Gradient aggregation
8: θS = AdamOptimizer.apply gradients
Ä
θS,∇θe,iS
ä
9: for K ∈ {1,2, · · · ,N} do
10: sync send (K,θS)
11: end for
12: end for
13: end for
14: end while
Algorithm 2 presents the model generation procedure con-
ducted by the cloud server involving both model aggregation
and model update operations. As shown in steps 2-13, the
sever needs to perform E×d |nat|b e rounds of interactions with
all the devices to form a robust model for federated defense.
After receiving gradients from all the devices in step 5, step
7 aggregates the gradients according to Equation (3), and step
8 applies the aggregation result to the current model, i.e., θS.
Note that the receive function in step 5 is a blocking function.
When one round is finished, steps 9-11 send the newly updated
model weight information to each connected IIoT devices for
the model synchronization.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we imple-
mented our FDA3 approach on top of a cloud-based architec-
ture, which consists of a cloud server and a set of connected
IIoT devices. Since we focus on classification accuracy, the
behavior of cloud servers and IIoT devices are all simulated
on a workstation with Intel i7-9700k CPU, 16GB memory,
NVIDA GeForce GTX1080Ti GPU, and Ubuntu operating
system. We adopted Tensorflow (version 1.12.0) and Keras
(version 2.2.4) to construct all DNN models in our framework.
To validate our approach, we conducted two case studies using
LeNet [27] for dataset MNIST [28], and ResNet [29] for
CIFAR10 [30], respectively. The initial LeNet model is trained
using 60000 training examples from the MNIST dataset, and
the initial ResNet model is trained using 50000 training
examples from the CIFAR10 dataset. Note that both MNIST
and CIFAR10 datasets have a test set of 10000 examples,
individually. We divided them into two halves, where 5000
examples are used for re-training and the remaining 5000
examples are used for testing.
A. Performance Comparison
In the first experiment, we considered an IIoT application
that has 10 devices connected to the same cloud server
for federated defense. Since most IIoT devices are memory
constrained, we assumed that the DNN model on an IIoT
device can only keep 100 nature examples for adversarial
training. We considered five well-known types of attacks in
the experiment, i.e., FGSM [17], BIM [15], JSMA [18], CW2
[19], and DeepFool [20], where each type was used to attack
two out of the ten IIoT devices. To enable adversarial training,
for each device we generated 100 adversarial examples for
the 100 nature examples using the assigned attack scheme,
respectively. Note that all the adversarial examples here were
generated by transfer attacks, assuming that the initial model
can be obtained while the intermediate retrained models cannot
be accessed by malicious adversaries. Similar to [17], we set
the hyperparameter α to 0.5, which indicates that both normal
and adversarial losses contribute to the total loss equally.
For the federated training of adversarial attacks, we set the
batch size to 100 pairs of nature and adversarial examples. In
6this case, an epoch consists of only one iteration, which can
be considered as a round for the retraining of all the collected
example pairs on a device. We set the epoch number to 50.
Once one epoch is finished, the IIoT devices need to send
the updated gradient information to their corresponding cloud
server to perform aggregation.
To enable the performance comparison with the model
derived by our federated defense approach, we also gen-
erated the models by training the 100 example pairs lo-
cally using different types of attacks individually. We
use the notation None to denote the initial model with-
out any retraining. We use the notation X+AdvTrain (X∈
{FGSM,BIM,JSMA,CW2,DeepFool}) to indicate the model
of an IIoT device that is retrained locally based on the
100 adversarial examples made by attacks of type X. The
notation FL+AdvTrain denotes the model generated by our
federated defense approach. For fair comparison, we also
applied all the five attack types on a randomly selected IIoT
device among the 10 devices. In this case, we generated 500
adversarial examples to retrain the model locally (with a batch
of 100 example pairs) and got the new model ALL+AdvTrain.
Figure 2 shows the inference accuracy results for the MNIST
dataset. As shown on the X-axis, we used the notation Nature
to denote the 5000 test examples without any attack from the
MNIST dataset. The other notations on X-axis indicate the
adversarial test sets generated by a specific attack type based
on Nature.
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Fig. 2: Performance comparison between different defense
methods for MNIST dataset
From Figure 2, we can find that FL+AdvTrain achieves the
best prediction accuracy among seven out of eight models
except Nature. For the Nature test set, the None method
slightly outperforms our approach by 0.08%. This is be-
cause the FL+AdvTrain model includes new adversarial ex-
amples in the retraining. For the remaining five test sets,
we can find that FL+AdvTrain outperforms the other seven
models significantly. As an example of DeepFool test set,
the FL+AdvTrain model can achieve better accuracy than
the DeepFool+AdvTrain model by 13.5%, though Deep-
Fool+AdvTrain is retrained specific for DeepFool attacks.
Note that comparing with the ALL+AdvTrain model, our
FL+AdvTrain shows much better accuracy for all the six attack
types. In other words, our federated learning is a better choice
for IIoT deployment than all the locally retrained models for
specific devices.
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Fig. 3: Performance comparison between different defense
methods for CIFAR10 dataset
We also checked the performance of federated defense
method on the CIFAR10 dataset. Figure 3 shows the compari-
son results. Similar to the observations from Figure 2, we can
find that our approach outperforms the other seven methods.
In this experiment, we can observe that the ALL+AdvTrain
model shows better accuracy comparing with other models
with specific attacks.
Since IIoT devices are deployed in an uncertain environment
with more and more emerging new attacks, we also checked
the robustness of models generated by our approach using new
attacks. Figure 4 presents the robustness comparison results
between different defense methods against a new type of
attacks, i.e., SIMBA [21]. We used the eight models generated
in Figure 2 and Figure 3 for this new attack. We generated
5000 test examples using SIMBA and applied each model on
this test set individually. We can find that for both MNIST and
CIFAR10 datasets our FL+AdvTrain model can resist more
SIMBA attacks than the other models. As an example for
MNIST test set, our method has an accuracy of 73.8%, while
the ALL+AdvTrain model only has an accuracy of 71.9%. In
other words, the robustness of our federated defense method is
better than other local adversarial training methods to defend
new attacks.
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
MNIST CIFAR10
A
c c
u
r a
c y
 (
%
)
Dataset
None FGSM+AdvTrain BIM+AdvTrain JSMA+AdvTrain
CW2+AdvTrain DeepFool+AdvTrain FL+AdvTrain ALL+AdvTrain
Fig. 4: Performance comparison between different defense
methods for SIMBA attack
7B. Scalability Analysis
The first experiment only investigates an IIoT application
with only 10 devices. However, a typical IIoT application
may involve dozes of or hundreds of devices. Therefore, to
verify whether our approach can be applied to large-scale
IIoT applications, we conducted the second experiment to
check the scalability of our approach. Figure 5 shows the
trend of prediction accuracy along with the increment of the
number of IIoT devices over the MNIST dataset. In this
experiment, we used our FDA3 to generate the model for IIoT
devices. Similar to the scheme used in the first experiment,
we considered five attack types (i.e., FGSM, BIM, JSMA,
CW2, DeepFool) for the adversarial example generation. We
assumed that there were one fifth of devices attacked by a
specific type of attacks. For example, if there are 10 devices
involved in an IIoT application, there will be 2 devices for
each of the five investigated attack types. We investigated 7
types of test examples, where Nature denotes a test set of 5000
nature examples, and the other six test sets of 5000 examples
each are labeled using the attack type.
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Fig. 5: The impact of the number of IIoT devices for our
federated defense methods on MNIST dataset
From Figure 5 we can find that the prediction accuracy for
Nature is the highest. Moreover, we can find that when more
devices are engaged in federated defense, the accuracy for
Nature test set can still be slightly improved. The same trend
can be observed from the other six adversarial test sets. As
an example for the JSMA test set, when the number of IIoT
devices increases from 10 to 50, the accuracy can be improved
from 85.4% to 87.8%. Note that in the federated defense,
the attack type SIMBA is not considered. Therefore, we can
observe that the prediction accuracy for SIMBA adversarial
test set is the lowest. However, we can find an accuracy
improvement along the increment of the number of devices,
i.e., from 73.8% to 74.8%.
Figure 6 shows the results of our federated defense method
on CIFAR10 dataset. We can observe the similar trend com-
pared with the results shown in Figure 5. As an example for
the BIM test set, when the number of IIoT devices increases
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Fig. 6: The impact of the number of IIoT devices for our
federated defense methods on CIFAR10 dataset
from 10 to 50, the accuracy can be improved from 73.5%
to 81.3%. Moreover, for the SIMBA test set, the accuracy
can be significantly improved from 42.2% to 49.1%. In other
words, the more devices with high diversities are involved
in federated defense, the more attacks the obtained model
can resist. Therefore, our approach is promising especially for
large-scale IIoT applications.
V. CONCLUSION
Although DNN-based techniques are becoming popular
in IIoT applications, they are suffering from an increasing
number of adversarial attacks. How to generate DNNs that are
immune to various types of attacks (especially newly emerging
attacks) is becoming a major bottleneck in the deployment
of safety-critical IIoT applications. To address this problem,
this paper proposes a novel federated defense approach for
cloud-based IIoT applications. Based on a modified federated
learning framework and our proposed loss function for adver-
sarial learning, our approach can effectively synthesize DNNs
to accurately resist existing adversarial attacks, while the data
privacy among different IIoT devices is guaranteed. Exper-
imental results on two well-known benchmarks demonstrate
that our approach can not only improve the overall defense
performance against various existing adversarial attacks, but
also can accurately detect DNN misbehaviors caused by new
kinds of attacks.
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